General
The research reported in this paper is part of a project called "Animacy in typology and discourse".
1 One of the aims of this project is to investigate the role of the notion of animacy in different parts of grammar, and gender is one of the most obvious places where animacy shows up. The aim of this paper, then, is twofold. One is to consider some generalizations about gender systems, based primarily on Corbett (1991) , a recent comprehensive survey of gender and gender systems with data from over 200 languages. The other is to discuss, in the light of these typological generalizations, some of the theoretical notions needed to describe gender systems, in particular the concept of semantic gender.
For an overview of animacy in general and the problems that interest us in the project, the reader is referred to Dahl & Fraurud (forthcoming) . Here, I shall briefly mention some facts that are essential for the understanding of the rest of the paper.
Animacy, or the distinction between animate and inanimate entities, is so pervasive in the grammars of human languages that it tends to be taken for granted and become invisible. It is only relatively recently that more systematic studies of animacy have been undertaken in linguistics. Many of these have concentrated on what has been called the animacy hierarchy, its role in various grammatical categories and its interaction with other notions such as definiteness, individuation and degree of referentiality. The animacy hierarchy is supposed to have (at least) the following components: HUMAN>ANIMAL>INANIMATE. Hierarchies of this kind have been assumed by typologists to underlie various implicational universals. The general idea is that grammatical phenomena will "obey" the hierarchy in the sense that certain generalizations will apply to all cases above a certain cutoff point in the hierarchy. For instance, in case marking systems, direct objects are more likely to be marked if they have a high degree of animacy. Below, I will be using the animacy hierarchy quite extensively in making generalizations about gender systems. In fact, grammatical gender is one of the areas where it is easiest to do so, since animacy does not interact with other parameters in the way it does in many other parts of grammar. However, in Dahl & Fraurud (forthcoming) , we argue that what has been referred to in the literature as the animacy hierarchy is essentially a reflection of different ways of realizing grammatically a fuzzy dichotomy, at the base of which is the distinction between persons, that is, essentially human beings perceived as agents, and the rest of the universe. The dichotomy is fuzzy because we have the possibility of sometimes treating inanimate entities as persons and, perhaps less often, human beings as nonpersons, in one sense or the other. This also shows up clearly in gender systems: it is misleading, in most cases, to think of ANIMAL as a single "step" in the hierarchyrather, gender distinctions often cut through the animal kingdom, with at least some higher animals being treated as persons and at least some lower ones being seen as inanimate. When discussing gender, then, it is more fruitful to think of the hierarchy as a continuum. In the end, the existence of various types of borderline cases of personhood, such as "nonpersonal agents", including organizations, companies, states etc., and metaphorical and metonymical references to inanimate and abstract entities of different kinds, destroys the possibility of assuming that this continuum can be seen as a onedimensional linear ordering.
2. Animacy and the semantic core of gender systems Following Hockett's definition of gender (1958:231) as "classes of nouns reflected in the behavior of associated words", Corbett (1991) sees grammatical agreement as the determining criterion of gender, and says that the assignment of gender to nouns may depend on two kinds of information: the meaning of the noun and its form, the latter in its turn including on one hand morphological and on the other phonological information.
Corbett joins Aksenov 1984 in the important claim that all gender assignment systems have a semantic core. He does not go very far in characterizing what this core would look like, however. In my opinion, this is the place where the role of animacy becomes crucial. Another way of expressing Aksenov's generalization is to say that a typical gender system has two poles: one semantic and one nonsemantic, where "nonsemantic" may be interpreted as "formal" or maybe "arbitrary". What is important here is that the relation between the poles tends to be asymmetric with respect to animacy: animate nouns normally get their gender by semantic rules, whereas inanimate nouns may or may not have semantic gender.
2 ) I have found no evidence of any gender system -neither in the rich crosslinguistic material presented by Corbett, nor anywhere else -in which this would not hold as a general rule, although there are in practically every case individual lexical items that act as exceptions.
Let us thus postulate the following as a universal property of gender systems:
(1) In any gender system, there is a general semantically based principle for assigning gender to animate nouns and noun phrases.
The ways in which the principle in (1) is applied are quite limited. I shall mention two major sources of variation. The first one is:
(2) the domain of the principle referred to in (1) may be cut off at different points of the animacy hierarchy: between humans and animals, between higher and lower animals, or between animals and inanimates Some examples of this kind of variation (from Corbett's material) are: In Tamil (and many other Dravidian languages) there are separate genders for male humans and female humans respectively. Everything else is assigned to a third gender (Corbett 1991, 9) . Here, then, the cutoff point is between humans and everything else. In many Indo-European languages, humans and also, to a varying extent, higher animals, are assigned masculine or feminine gender on the basis of their sex, while inanimates and lower animals get their genders by lexemespecific or formal criteria. For Ket (isolate), Corbett (1991, 19 ) characterizes the threemember system as "male animate, female animate, and residue" -that is, inanimates are assigned any of the three genders. Here, the cutoff point goes between animates and inanimates, although, characteristically, some lower ("nonsexdifferentiable") animals are assigned gender in an unpredictable fashion.
The second source of variation concerns the operation of the semantically based principle in (1):
All animates above the cutoff point may be either be assigned to the same gender or there may be further divisions.
(3) may sound like an "anything goes" rule but it is in fact heavily restricted as follows: (4) If the principle referred to in 1 distributes animate nouns among different genders, sex is the major criterion.
The pervasiveness of sex as gender criterion is striking. There are many possible ways of classifying animates, in particular human beings, that might be used as a basis for gender, such as social status, ethnic origin, profession, age, hair color etc. but none of them except perhaps age seems to play any important role in gender assignment. The frequency of sexbased gender distinctions to some extent hides the importance of animacy. Note, however, that sex is a criterion applicable only to animates, and that "sexual differentiation" holds of all virtually all entities above a certain point on the animacy hierarchy, which is reflected in the fact that sexual differentiation is sometimes used as the main criterion for grammatical animacy.
The asymmetry of gender systems with respect to animacy shows up in various more or less subtle ways. Corbett uses the notion of "semantic residue", defined as those nouns whose gender is not assigned according to a positive semantic criterion. Since exceptions in gender systems follow the principle that "nouns which do not meet the relevant semantic criterion are treated as though they did, rather than vice versa", (Corbett 1991, 13) , Corbett rejects the possibility of formulating gender assignment rules in terms of negative criteria. From this, then, follows the notion of "semantic residue". By a more vivid metaphor, we could talk of "wastebasket genders".
It appears that the semantic residue practically always consists of inanimate nouns. Accordingly, inanimate nouns are quite often assigned to genders whose semantically determined core consists of animates, whereas the converse situation appears to be quite rare, except for a small set of welldefined cases, which we shall discuss below. There are often quite a few inanimate genders, and considerable arbitrariness in the ways genders are assigned to inanimate nouns: typically, we find mixtures of semantic, formal, and idiosyncratic marking. Table 1 shows some examples of how gender systems are typically structured, which should illustrate many of the points made above. Animate categories are indicated in small caps.
Table 1. Some gender systems -in here
Especially in the more complex systems, there are complicating factors that make the picture slightly less neat than might be expected from what we have already said.
To start with, individual lexical items and also whole groups of such items may be treated as exceptions to the general gender assignment principle which determines the gender of animate nouns. For instance, in Swedish the word vittne 'witness' is neuter gender. At least synchronically, there seems to be no motivation for this. This kind of situation seems to be quite widespread.
Commonly, derivatives such as augmentatives and diminutives obey special rules. Thus, in German, diminutives in -chen and -lein are all neuter. Here, then, there is a productive rule overriding the general principle in (1). Synchronically, the rule should probably not be seen as semantic, although it may have been motivated from the beginning. It seems to be a rather common phenomenon for there to be a semantic rule which assigns an "inanimate" gender such as neuter to young or small animates, e.g. unmarried women, as in certain Polish dialects (Corbett 1991, 100) . One interpretation of this situation is to say that the cutoff point has been defined in such a way that these cases are seen as inanimate. Notice, however, that this has the rather questionable consequence that some humans have to be regarded as lower on the hierarchy than some animals. Instead, it appears that we have to admit the possibility of subsidiary criteria for gender assignment to animates.
Special genders for animals or certain kinds of animals are not too uncommon, but seem to arise mainly in gender systems above a certain degree of complexity, where there is at least a masculine:feminine distinction for humans. We see examples of this in tables above. However, some cases of 'animal genders' mentioned in the literature are spurious in the sense that they are results of there being two alternative cutoff points between animates and inanimates. Thus, the rule in Polish that says that the accusative of animate nouns is equal to the genitive applies to both humans and animals in the singular but only to humans in the plural. The animal gender then is simply the set of nouns that are treated differently in the singular and the plural.
In many languages, speakers may achieve various secondary effects by using the "wrong" gender for a referent, thereby as it were attributing to it the properties associated with that gender. Thus, it seems to be quite common in American English for inanimate objects to be referred to as he and she or for masculine pronouns to be used for women and vice versa or even for humans to be called it (Mathiot & Roberts 1979) . Such "upgrading" and "downgrading" may become more or less conventionalized, as when ships and countries are treated as feminine.
Lexical and referential gender
To get further in our understanding of the role of animacy in gender systems we must elucidate the nature of semantic gender. As we have seen, Corbett talks of semantic gender assignment to nouns as being dependent on their meaning. As a general characterization, this is problematic, and in fact not wholly consistent with Corbett's own formulations in other places. Thus, noting that in German, a noun phrase headed by the neuter noun Mädchen 'girl' may be the antecedent of both a feminine pronoun sie and a neuter pronoun es, he claims (1991, 245) that "the determination of the form of the pronoun can involve both the referent and the form of the antecedent". That is, sie is chosen because we are talking of a female individual, and for those feminine pronouns are normally used. The meaning of the noun Mädchen would thus be only indirectly relevant. This may be even clearer for anaphoric pronouns whose antecedents contain a sexneutral head noun, as in the English example (5), where the choice between he and she depends on the sex of the referent, which can hardly be said to be part of the meaning of doctor:
THE DOCTOR said HE/SHE could see me tomorrow.
The formulation used by Corbett, "doctor takes he when it denotes a male, and she when it denotes a female" (181) clouds the issue by using the verb "denote" rather than "refer". If we follow Lyons (1976, 208) in assuming that denotation, unlike reference, is "a relation that applies in the first instance to lexemes and holds independently of particular occasions of utterances", it should be clear from examples like (5) that semantic gender cannot be explained only in terms of nouns and their denotations but that also reference, which is primarily a property of noun phrases, has to be taken into account 3 . What I have now said implies a possible distinction with regard to the locus of gender. We may speak of gender on one hand as a property of a noun (as a lexical item), on the other, as a property of a noun phrase (as an occurrence). We may also postulate a distinction with regard to the source of gender: whether gender is determined on the basis of properties of a noun -what we can call lexical genderor on the basis of the referent of a noun phrase -what we can call referential gender. Neither of these distinctions coincides with that between semantic and nonsemantic gender. Whereas referential gender is in principle always semantic, lexical gender may be motivated by semantic and/or formal factors or be assigned on an arbitrary, lexemespecific basis. This fact comes out clearly in the case of gender conflicts, to which we now turn.
Gender conflicts
An important test area for any theory of gender is how well it can account for gender conflicts. By a gender conflict we then mean a situation where the gender assignment rules of a language may be applied in more than one way, yielding inconsistent outputs. One major type of gender conflicts is exemplified by the following German sentence, where das Mädchen 'the girl' may be treated either as feminine or neuter gender, depending on whether we give preference to the rule that females should be feminine or to the rule that diminutives in -chen are neuter: Let us look at the treatment of gender conflicts of this type in Corbett 1991 4 . According to Corbett. Mädchen is a "hybrid noun", a noun that can take agreement in more than one gender. The agreement may be semantic, that is, consistent with semantic gender assignment rules, or syntactic, i.e. "agreement consistent with the gender as it would be assigned by morphological or phonological assignment rules". Which alternative is chosen depends (among other things) on the place of the agreement target (the agreeing item) on what Corbett calls the Agreement Hierarchy, where "as we move rightwards...the likelihood of semantic agreement will increase monotonically (that is, with no intervening decrease)" (ibid.):
The Agreement Hierarchy (Corbett 1991, 226) : ATTRIBUTIVE < PREDICATE < RELATIVE PRONOUN < PERSONAL PRONOUN Corbett, then, associates the gender conflict in (6) with the distinction between semantic and formal criteria. We shall now argue that this identification is inadequate, in a number of ways.
The first objection is that Corbett's treatment leaves out cases where one way of assigning gender relies on an idiosyncratic lexical gender. Thus, instead of 6, we might quote 8, in which the (archaic) noun Weib 'woman', whose neuter gender is not motivated by its morphological or phonological makeup but has to be seen as an exceptional feature, is used instead of Mädchen:
Ich habe ein Weib gesehen. Sie/es war schön.'I saw a girl. She/it was beautiful' Gender conflicts involving idiosyncratic lexical gender could easily be accommodated by relabelling the second of the two conflicting types of agreement is labelled "nonsemantic" rather than "formal". There are trickier cases, however. Consider a Russian word like vrac ∨ 'doctor', which is normally masculine, but may also be treated as a feminine noun when it refers to a female. This gives rise to gender conflicts as when a female doctor may be referred to either as molodoj vrac ∨ 'young (masc.) doctor' or as molodaja vrac ∨ 'young (fem.) doctor'. Corbett (1991, 183-4) gives the following rather complex description of the behaviour of vrac ∨ :
"Thus vrac ∨ denoting a female is a hybrid noun...The choice of form to be used depends in part on the target type. Again this situation results from a conflict of the assignment rules, since the noun denotes a female (and so should be feminine) yet its declensional type is such that it should be masculine...Taking vrac ∨ as a whole, it is a curious composite with one half being masculine, apparently half of a double-gender noun (when a male is denoted), while the other half is a hybrid noun (when a female is denoted)." As we can see, Corbett ascribes the masculine gender of vrac ∨ -when it refers to a woman -to formal assignment rules, more specifically one referring to its declensional type. He is actually forced to do so to make it fit into his definition of a semantic-syntactic gender conflict. There are, however, similar cases that are considerably more difficult in this regard. The noun sud'ja 'judge' is regarded by Russian normative grammar as masculine only, although it may be used of women as well as of men and most crucially for our discussion ends in -a, which would normally make it feminine. In actual spoken Russian, however, it may be treated as a feminine noun, when it is used of females. We thus obtain gender conflicts similar to those found with vrac ∨ : a female judge may be talked of as strogij sud'ja 'strict (masc.) judge' or strogaja sud'ja 'strict (fem.) judge'. In this case, however, it is clear that one cannot invoke formal rules to explain the masculine gender of sud'ja. It is of course possible to treat it as an exception, and it would then fall under our revised version of Corbett's account, but that does not seem very attractive in view of the fact that sud'ja in this regard follows a general, semantically motivated pattern for Russian nouns denoting professions and the like, which are all masculine if not associated with a very clear female stereotype (such as medsestra '(medical) nurse'). This would leave us with a conflict between two different ways of assigning gender which both appear to be semantic. A somewhat similar situation arises in Swedish. In the socalled weak declension of Swedish adjectives, there is a gender distinction between masculine and nonmasculine, manifested in the choice between the endings -e and -a, respectively. In modern Swedish, this distinction is rather unstable, and intuitions vary. The cases that interest us would not be endorsed by normative grammar, but are not infrequent in texts. Like the Russian examples, they involve female referents using nouns denoting stereotypically male professions. Källström (1993, 101) quotes as a reallife example den avgångne justititeministern Anna-Greta Leijon 'the retired Minister of Law AnnaGreta Leijon', where avgångne takes the masculine ending in agreement with the noun justititeminister 'Minister of Law', in spite of Anna-Greta Leijon being a woman.
Another parallel case is quoted by Corbett himself. In Konkani (Indic), neuter agreements are used for young females, but not consistently: one thus finds mixed cases like (9), where awoy 'mother', a feminine noun, is used with an attribute marked as feminine and a verb marked as neuter: (9) M QLF L awoy aylε < John's.FEM mother came.NEUT According to Corbett, the feminine agreement is syntactic and the neuter semantic. However, it would appear that awoy is assigned its feminine gender by a semantic rule, 5 thus again leaving us with a conflict between two semantically assigned genders. Still another problematic kind of case is also treated, somewhat cursorily, by Corbett, viz . what he calls "boat nouns". As was mentioned above, ships may be referred to by the pronoun she in English, like also in some other languages (e.g. Swedish), but as Corbett points out (1991, 226) , they take the (inanimate) relative pronoun which rather than the animate who, 'a pattern allowed for by the Agreement Hierarchy'. Corbett actually does not state explicitly which of the alternatives is semantic and which is syntactic, but his reference to the Agreement Hierarchy implies that the feminine gender is semantic. Still, it would appear that the use of the inanimate relative pronoun is also motivated on semantic grounds, and in any case, it is hard to see in what sense it would be considered to be based on formal criteria.
What is then the alternative? What I would like to suggest here is that such gender conflicts as obey Corbett's Agreement Hierarchy actually represent a conflict between lexical and referential gender. Thus, the choice between masculine and feminine agreement in the case of Russian sud'ja when referring to women as judges is not one between semantic and formal gender but between two kinds of semantic gender: lexical and referential. The gender of a noun, qua lexical item, is decided once and for all, rather than on each occasion when the noun is used. Accordingly, semantic lexical gender tends to depend on general stereotypes connected with the denotations of nouns rather than on concrete properties of referents.
For my proposal, it is of some importance to relate the distinction between lexical and referential gender to the animacybased asymmetry in gender systems, manifested in principle (1). The assumption that I want to make is that the propensity for letting gender be determined referentially rather than lexically increases as we go up the animacy hierarchy. Thus, referential gender will tend to be the default case above the cutoff point mentioned in (1), that is, for the application domain of the semanticallydetermined principle for animate gender assignment. However, lexical gender may sometimes come to the fore, especially at the leftmost end of the Agreement Hierarchy.
Looking at the extreme cases, the Agreement Hierarchy implies (in Corbett's terms) that formal agreement is more probable if the target is an NP-internal adjective than if it is an anaphoric NP agreeing with another NP. If we now substitute "agreement with the lexical properties of a noun" for "formal agreement" here, this would not be too surprising: the propensity for lexical agreement would be greatest when the role of the head noun of the NP is most salient, that is, in NP-internal agreement.
Gender conflicts can be expected to arise whenever the referential gender determined by the properties of the referent of an NP contradict the lexical gender of its head noun. This may happen in several types of situations, and is compatible with the lexical gender being semantically, formally or idiosyncratically determined: 1) When the lexical gender of the head noun is semantically determined, gender conflicts arise if the noun phrase has a referent whose actual properties for one reason or another contradict the stereotypical properties determining the associated with the head noun, as in Russian professiondenoting nouns used of females or noun phrases used metonymically, metaphorically or ironically.
2) Examples of conflicts between a formally determined lexical gender and referential gender are cases like German Mädchen, whose lexical gender can be attributed to its diminutive ending.
3) Finally, a gender conflict may arise in a case like German Weib, whose lexical gender is idiosyncratically determined for that lexeme.
Most of the examples of gender conflicts discussed in Corbett (1991) and elsewhere in the literature concern animate referents. A notable exception is the use of feminine gender for referring to ships etc. in English and other languages. It seems that it is less common for gender to be assigned to inanimates by general semantically or referentially based rules. Such semantic regularities as exist among inanimates tend to be tendencies or default assignments which are in general weaker than the rules applying to animates. However, there is a possible counterexample to what I have just said, in Swedish, in fact. There seems to be a tendency in spoken Swedish to use the "Uter" pronoun den to refer to singular instances of concrete, countable inanimate objects (e.g. pieces of furniture, instruments etc.), even if the nouns used to refer to these objects are "Neuter" and according to normative grammar, the "Neuter" pronoun det should be used. In the case of NP-internal agreement, on the other hand, "Uter" forms are unlikely with these nouns. One interesting feature of this gender conflictwhich indeed seems to obey the Agreement Hierarchy -is that it involves semantic properties that are known to interact with animacy, most notably individuation and degree of referentiality.
Let us look at the advantages and disadvantages of the treatment I am proposing here. One clear advantage is that it dispenses with complex descriptions like Corbett's treatment of Russian vrac ∨ , quoted above, and in general with the notion of "hybrid noun", which means a significant reduction of the number of nouns which are assumed to have more than one gender. A noun like vrac ∨ has by itself only one gender, masculine. When it is used with feminine agreement, this is to be explained as agreement depending on referential gender. On the other hand, the treatment I am suggesting may seem to introduce an unwanted redundancy in that we have to assume that e.g. a Russian noun phrase with a masculine noun as lexical head that refers to a male person is assigned masculine gender simultaneously in two ways: once from the referent and once from the noun. This is, I guess, disturbing especially to those persons whose scientific ideology tells them that a theory which does the same thing twice must be wrong. On the other hand, one may take a rather different view, namely that in human languages, different mechanisms tend to conspire in such a way that they give the same output, and that may in the long run be a more efficient way to construct a language, the assumption that referential and lexical gender tend to work in tandem is not at all repugnant. In addition, this assumption makes it possible to see gender conflicts as aberrant cases where the two mechanisms give contradictory results.
Concluding remarks
It is perhaps not so common for gender systems to reflect the distinction between animate and inanimate referents directly in the sense that there is one animate and one inanimate gender. In those languages that have such systems, e.g. the Algonquian languages, there is a clear tendency for the animate gender to intrude into the inanimate domain. The importance of animacy distinctions for gender systems is of a more indirect nature, rather as general organizing forces, determining at least partly the choices between referential and lexical or between semantic and nonsemantic gender. In fact, I think it is a mistake to think of gender systems as systems for classifying things: to the extent that they do so it is secondary to their function to make it easier to keep track of links between constituents.
One obvious question that arises is to what extent the generalizations made above hold also for other things than gender. A closely related phenomenon is that of numeral classifiers. What is said about these systems in the literature suggests that they may be governed by somewhat different principles. There is often a general classifier for animates, but it seems that it is usually not extended to inanimates. This is a matter that calls for further investigation.
Other grammatical subsystems may well turn out to be more like gender than numeral classifiers are. Consider, for instance, the genitive endings of masculine nouns in Polish. There are two main alternatives, -a, which is used for animate nouns and some inanimates, and -u, which is used for the rest, that is, only for inanimates. Thus, like in gender systems, there is here a general semantic principle which determines the choice for animate nouns, while inanimates are less predictable. It is somewhat tempting to redefine the term "gender" to include also such subsystems of grammar, but it may be better to keep to Hockett's definition, restricting gender to those distinctions that play a role in agreement, and coin a new label such as "quasigender" for phenomena like Polish genitives.
One possible way of summing up the above discussion of gender systems is to describe them as organized around three major dimensions which tend to go together:
animate -inanimate referential -lexical semantic -formal As I have already suggested, there are of course connections here to the ways in which what has been called the animacy hierarchy interacts with other phenomena in other parts of grammar. The connection between inanimate NPs and lexical/formal gender is perhaps less obvious. One possibly relevant observation is that inanimate noun phrases seem "noun-hungry" in the sense that they tend to require that a lexical noun is present or at least presupposed. Thus, quantifiers like many in many languages are interpreted as having animate referents if they occur without a head noun. (Exceptions are some very clear anaphoric uses, where the antecedent contains a lexical head.) The nounhungriness may also be reflected in a tendency to use definite nouns rather than pronouns as anaphors for inanimate referents, although this is rather difficult to pinpoint (Dahl & Fraurud, forthcoming; Fraurud, forthcoming) . This, then, suggests another line for further research. 
